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Side-channel attacks on practical quantum key distribution systems compromise its security. Although
some of these attacks can be taken into account, the general recipe of how to eliminate all side-channel
flaws is still missing. In this work, we propose a method for estimation of the total passive side-channel
information leakage from the Alice’s light source. The method relies on Hong-Ou-Mandel interference
between different signals emitted by Alice, which reveals their overall mode mismatch without the necessity
to measure all individual degrees of freedom independently. We include experimental values of interference
visibility in the security proof for the decoy-state BB84 protocol, and lower-bound the secure key rate for
realistic light sources. The obtained results provide a tool that can be used for certification of the current
QKD systems and pave the way towards the loophole-free design of the future ones.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows unconditional secrecy of sharing keys between distant users – the
transmitter (Alice) and the receiver (Bob). Although QKD is guaranteed to be theoretically secure, there
is a significant mismatch between the theoretical models and the real-world QKD systems. Even though
many of the device imperfections have been successfully included in the security proofs, drawbacks still
exist and need to be covered.
One of the issues that is not yet fully taken into account is side-channel information leakage from the
pulses emitted by Alice. Normally, QKD protocols assume that signals are completely indistinguishable
beyond the operational space which is used for encoding secure bits. This assumption, however, does not
usually hold in practice. Even if two lasers seem identical, actual parameters of the emitted light can vary.
Temporal, spatial and spectral differences of the pulses from independent sources have been experimentally
studied in the work [1]. Authors quantified mutual information between side-channel parameters and bit
values without addressing security proofs. Later on, based on Koashi security proof [2], a model of side
channels for the Trojan-horse attack was developed [3, 4]. This model can be adopted for passive side-
channel effects estimation.
In this regard, the most vulnerable type of setup is a multiple laser source system. For example,
polarization encoding is widely used for free space QKD, as atmosphere induces only minor disturbance
of the polarization state of light. The simplest way to implement polarization encoding for BB84 protocol
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at gigahertz frequencies is to use four different lasers, one for each state [5–8]. Furthermore, there are many
fiber-channel setups that are based on multiple lasers, some of them implement quantum cryptography
beyond QKD [9,10].
Previous work propose individual measurements of different degrees of freedom to access information
about pulses’ similarity. To prove unconditional security, however, one needs to measure all possible
characteristics, whereas individual measurements of the entire set of separate parameters can be highly
complicated. Moreover, the identical partial distributions do not guarantee that the joint distributions
are also identical. For example, the same temporal and spatial distributions do not guarantee that the
joint distributions of intensity in time and space also match. As well as spectral distribution may depend
on time due to the frequency chirp of a laser source [11].
In contrast to individual measurements of separate degrees of freedom, the effect of interference allows
to study the overall distinguishability of the pulses, since distinguishable states do not interfere [12]. For
example, fourth-order, or Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM), interference is a standard method for characterization
of single-photon sources [13,14]. The possibility of utilizing HOM interference to characterize unmeasured
degrees of freedom for the QKD sources with multiple lasers has been mentioned in work [15].
In this work, we propose to use HOM interference of phase-randomized weak coherent pulses (PRWCPs)
to study their distinguishability, and upper-bound the influence of side-channel effects that can possibly
compromise the security of QKD. We calculate the key generation rate depending on the visibility between
different states and show the practical applicability of the proposed method.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 1 we describe Hong-Ou-Mandel effect for PRWCPs from the
quantum point of view, and link visibility of HOM interference with distinguishability of interfering states.
Next, in Sec. 2 the results of the HOM interference are used to calculate the value of bases imbalance.
Then, in Sec. 3 the value of bases imbalance are used to correct estimation of single-photon error rate,
and, finally, obtain key generation rate for different values of HOM visibility. Based on currently known
experimental results, applicability of the proposed method is discussed in Sec. 4.
1 Hong-Ou-Mandel interference and non-orthogonality of quantum
states
The fourth-order interference of single photons has been introduced by Hong, Ou and Mandel in 1987
in order to measure the time delay between single photons precisely [13]. The key idea is that two
indistinguishable single photons matched on a 50:50 beam-splitter always exit it pairwise. Experimental
setup to observe the effect is illustrated in the Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: Typical setup for HOM experiment (on the left). Two single-photon pulses enter a beamsplit-
ter, while coincidence counts are measured with two single-photon detectors (SPDs). Dependence of the
number of coincidence counts on the time delay ∆t has a dip that corresponds to the maximum overlap
of photons on the beamsplitter (on the right).
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Single photon detectors in both arms allow to count coincidence clicks, when two photons leave the
beamsplitter in different arms. While the time difference ∆t between single-photon wavepackets is large
enough so that the photons do not overlap, their behaviour is independent from each other. As a result,
coincidence clicks are observed in half of the detection events.
As soon as overlap becomes non-zero, the number of coincidence click decreases. In the limit of perfectly
mode-matched pure single-photon states, coincidence clicks completely vanish. In order to characterise
the indistinguishability of photons, the visibility of HOM-interference is introduced as the difference
between the maximum and minimum numbers of coincidence clicks, divided by the maximum number
of coincidence clicks: V = (Nmax − Nmin)/Nmax (Fig. 1). It is easy to see, that visibility equals 0 for
completely orthogonal (distinguishable) states and equals 1 in case of perfect indistinguishability. In case
one knows the density matrices of the single-photon states (ρˆsp1 and ρˆ
sp
2 ), the visibility can be calculated
as:
Vρˆsp1 ρˆ
sp
2
= Tr (ρˆsp1 ρˆ
sp
2 ) . (1)
Most of the practical QKD systems utilize phase randomised weak coherent pulses (PRWCPs) instead
of the single-photon states. Nevertheless, a HOM-like effect also takes place for two PRWCPs as well,
though the coincidence clicks never totally disappear. The maximum possible visibility obtained in this
type of experiment is 0.5. In contrast to the single-photon case, the HOM effect for PRWCPs can be
explained both from classical and quantum points of view. It is quite natural as coherent states could be
treated as the “most classical” quantum states. Anyway, in this paper we focus on the quantum approach
and study how the visibility depends on the characteristics of interfering states.
The PRWCPs can be expressed as a Poissonian combination of independent Fock states [16]. Let us
consider two such states ρˆ1 and ρˆ2 with equal intensity µ at a 50:50 beamsplitter. Their density matrices
can be written in Fock basis as follows:
ρˆ =
∞∑
n=0
ρnn |n〉 〈n| =
∞∑
n=0
e−µ
2 µn
n!
(aˆ†)n |0〉〈0| (aˆ)n. (2)
To simulate a real system one has to take into account detection efficiency, including both optical
losses and single-photon detector efficiency. Here we consider µ as effective intensity of states, corrected
for detection imperfections. Thereby the input state on a beamsplitter is:
ρˆin = ρˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2 = e−µ2
(
|0102〉〈0102|+ µ
(
|0112〉〈1102|+ |1102〉〈0112|
)
+
+
µ2
2
(
|0122〉〈0122|+ 2 |1112〉〈1112|+ |2102〉〈2102|
)
+O(µ3)
)
. (3)
We omit the terms higher than the second degree, as we consider µ to be small. As soon as the terms
with the total photon number less than two do not contribute to coincidence clicks, the only states that
we need to study are:
ρˆ
′
in =
e−µ2µ2
2
(
|0122〉〈0122|+ 2 |1112〉〈1112|+ |2102〉〈2102|
)
. (4)
In case of orthogonal modes, all three terms: |0122〉〈0122|, |1112〉〈1112| and |2102〉〈2102| contribute equally
to coincidence clicks. The middle term |1112〉〈1112| leads to the standard single-photon HOM effect, i.e. for
perfect node-matching coincidences vanish. At the same time, coincidence clicks due to the other terms:
|0122〉〈0122| and |2102〉〈2102| never change, since there is no interference with vacuum. Thus the maximum
visibility value is 0.5. In the intermediate case of partial distinguishability, the number of coincidence
clicks from the state |1112〉〈1112| reduces by the factor of (1− Vρˆsp1 ρˆsp2 ), according to the (1), resulting in
visibility for PRWCPs
3
Vρˆ1ρˆ2 =
1
2
Vρˆsp1 ρˆ
sp
2
=
1
2
Tr (ρˆsp1 ρˆ
sp
2 ) . (5)
In these calculations we neglect high order terms. To check the applicability limit of the obtained result,
we carry out numerical simulations, including terms up to the 20-th degree. Simulation results (Fig. 2)
show that for µ below 0.025 photons per pulse the equation (5) is very close to the actual behaviour. Even
for higher values of µ (e.g. 0.25) the dependence remains very close to linear, however the visibility limit
should be slightly corrected. For µ value more than 1 photon per pulse Eq. 5 is no longer applicable.
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Figure 2: Simulation results for HOM visibility of phase randomized weak coherent pulses (PRWCPs),
depending on the HOM visibility for single-photon states within the PRWCPs. Plot shows the dependence
for different mean photon numbers per pulse µ. Simulation is done including the terms (3) up to the 20-th
degree.
2 Side-channel information and HOM visibility
Side channel is a collective name for vulnerabilities that can cause information leakage to Eve, bypassing
the communication protocol. Here we address only passive type of side-channels for Alice’s device, meaning
that information can be partially revealed via the distinguishability of pulses in non-operational degrees of
freedom. In other words, we consider mode mismatch between different optical signals, emitted by Alice.
We address conventional BB84 protocol with decoy states and study distinguishability between the
two bases [2,3], caused by the non-operational degrees of freedom. This approach is sufficient to quantify
all BB84 vulnerabilities caused by distinguishability, as it has been proven, that for identical bases density
matrices all bit flaws cause an increase of the respective error rate [17].
Ideally, the protocol implies that Eve is not able to discriminate one basis from the other, as their
density matrices ρˆx =
1
2(|H〉〈H|+ |V 〉〈V |) and ρˆz = 12(|D〉〈D|+ |A〉〈A|) are supposed to be the same. Non-
perfect mode matching between the different bits causes the differences in the bases density matrices,
resulting in a vulnerability that could be exploited by Eve. The value that allows to quantify the impact
of this effect is so-called bases imbalance [2, 3]:
4
∆ =
1−√F(ρˆx, ρˆz)
2
, (6)
Where F(ρˆx, ρˆz) is fidelity between the density matrices [18,19]
F(ρˆx, ρˆz) =
(
Tr
√√
ρˆxρˆz
√
ρˆx
)2
=
(
Tr |
√
ρˆx
√
ρˆz|
)2
. (7)
It is easy to see that in the perfect case, when ρˆx and ρˆz are indistinguishable, ∆ equals 0, whereas in the
worst case scenario, it reaches its maximum value 1/2.
We can express density matrices of X and Z bases as sums of bits, each of which is a tensor product
of density matrices in operational and non-operational degrees of freedom:
ρˆx =
1
2
(
1 0
0 0
)
⊗ ρˆλx,0 +
1
2
(
0 0
0 1
)
⊗ ρˆλx,1, (8)
ρˆz =
1
2
(
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
)
⊗ ρˆλz,0 +
1
2
(
1/2 −1/2
−1/2 1/2
)
⊗ ρˆλz,1, (9)
where ρˆλb,i accounts for non-operational degrees of freedom for the bit i in the basis b.
In Appendix B we construct a lower bound on fidelity between X and Z bases depending on the fidelity
between density matrices of non-operational degrees of freedom. Then, using the triangle inequality for
Bures angle [20], we obtain the result:
arccos
√
F(ρˆx, ρˆz) ≤ arccos max
i,j∈0,1
√
F (ρˆλx,i, ρˆ
λ
z,j) +
∑
b∈{x,z}
arccos
1 +
√
F (ρˆλb,0, ρˆ
λ
b,1)
2
. (10)
Here the first term indicates the difference between the bases, whereas the second term represents differ-
ences between the bits within bases. This result allows us to estimate bases imbalance with only pairwise
interference experiments with separate pulses. To conduct an interference experiment on non-operational
degrees of freedom, we only need to match the bits in operational space. Fig. 3 illustrates an example a
of possible optical setup that could be used to carry out such kind of experiment for a QKD system with
polarization encoding. A delayed Mach-Zender interferometer allows two consequent pulses to overlap on
a beamsplitter with two single-photon detectors (SPD) at the output. A half-wave plate is used to match
the polarization of different bits. It can also be used instead of the time delay to vary the degree of mode
overlap.
Figure 3: Concept of a possible optical scheme, that can be used for HOM-based basis test of polarization-encoding
system. One of the interferometer arms is delayed, so that two consequent pulses are matched on a beam-splitter.
Half-wave plate is used for polarization matching of two states.
Finally, we establish a connection between visibility and fidelity. In Appendix A we derive an equation
to calculate fidelity for two arbitrary PRWCPs (ρˆ1, ρˆ2) with equal mean photon number µ depending on
their HOM visibility: √
F (ρˆ1, ρˆ2) = exp
(
µ(
√
2 Vρˆ1ρˆ2 − 1)
)
. (11)
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We substitute this result into equation (10). In principle, every two pulses have their own value of
visibility, but to simplify the visualization of the final result, we demonstrate the special case when every
pair of bits has the same visibility value V:
1− 2∆ ≥ cos
(
2 arccos
1 + eµ(
√
2V−1)
2
+ arccos eµ(
√
2V−1)
)
. (12)
3 Key generation rate
In the previous section we have shown how HOM experiments’ results could be used for upper-bounding
the degree of distinguishability for both BB84 and decoy-state techniques. The final goal of this procedure
is to find the secret key rate, depending on the measurement results. In this section we simulate the
key generation rate for a system with BB84 protocol and two decoy states (i.e. three intensities). The
asymptotic key generation rate can be lower bounded as [21]:
K ≥ max
Is,Id
[
1
2
(ps1Y
s
1L[1− h(es1U )]− f(Es)Qsh(Es))
]
. (13)
Here maximization is done among the intensities of signal (Is) and decoy (Id) states. The second decoy
state intensity is considered to be zero. The probability of generating single photon for a signal state is
ps1 = Ise
−Is , according to the Poisson distribution. The lower bound for the yield of single photon for
signal states is Y s1L, and e
s
1U is the upper bound for single photon error rate within a signal state. Q
s is
the signal state gain, f(Es) is the efficiency of error correction and h(Es) is the binary Shannon entropy
with the signal error rate Es as an argument.
The parameter affected by the bases imperfections is the es1U , as Eve has an ability to get more
information with the same overall error rate.
For simulation we use error correction coefficient f(Es) = 1.2; fiber attenuation 0.2 dB/km; Bob’s
device losses 3 dB; detector efficiency 25%, optical error rate 1% and dark count probability per gate 10−5.
These values match with the ones used in previous simulations [3,4]. To achieve higher key rates, we make
reasonable assumption that Bob’s losses are calibrated and cannot be lowered by Eve. This assumption
is also quite common for QKD models [22–24]. Finally, to minimize the number of displayed parameters
we substitute the same visibility values for all pairs of sources within the simulation.
To simulate the effect of bases distinguishability, we use a method developed in [3]. The calculated
imbalance is corrected taking into account the ability of Eve to use lossless channel.
∆′ =
∆
Y˜ s1L
, (14)
where Y˜ s1L is the minimum single-photon yield among two bases, obtained using the decoy-state method.
Here we assume that decoy-state method doesn’t have any additional vulnerabilities. Once corrected, the
basis imbalance is included in the upper bound of single-photon error of signal state:
(es1U )
′ = 4(1−∆′)∆′(1− 2es1U ) + 4(1− 2∆′)
√
∆′(1−∆′)es1U (1− es1U ). (15)
With the help of the above estimations, we perform a simulation of key generation rate. Visibility
values used for simulation are chosen so that they can be compared with current experimental results
that we discuss in the next section.
Simulation results shown in the Fig. 4, indicate that key generation rate is highly sensitive to the
distinguishability of the bases of BB84 protocol (Fig. 4). Even for pretty high values of visibility like
0.495, the key rate drops significantly. On the other hand, for the visibility as low as 0.47 key generation
is still possible.
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Figure 4: Key generation rate depending on the communication distance for different values of HOM
visibility for mode-matched states.
4 Applications and discussion
To check applicability of the proposed method for practical setups, we take the best to date fourth-order
PRWCPs interference visibilities from various experiments carried out for the MDI-QKD [25–29].
HOM visibility
da Silva et al. [25] 0.478
Rubenok et al. [26] 0.47± 0.01
Tang et al. [27] 0.475± 0.010
Comandar et al. [29] (without post-selection) 0.487± 0.003
Comandar et al. [29] (with post-selection) 0.499± 0.004
Table 1: Best to date HOM visibility results with PRWCPs.
According to the results of the previous section, it is clear that all listed results provide positive key
rate. It should be also noted that latest results saturate theoretical limit [29]. This fact allows to expect
more precise experiments in the future.
As it has been mentioned [29], one of the main reasons of non-perfect interference between the pulses
from independent gain-switched semiconductor laser diodes is the combination of frequency chirp and
emition time jitter. While the former is a vulnerability that could be used by Eve to extract information
about the states, the latter can be truly quantum as the time uncertainty includes spontaneous emission
jitter. This leads to possible underestimation of the key generation rate, as quantum jitter dramatically
decreases the interference visibility but does not compromise the setup.
To date, the best visibility has been achieved with the help of optical seeding, that leads to reduction
of jitter from approximately 30 ps to 10 ps [29]. Moreover, authors performed post-selection on the results,
removing double clicks which are separated by time interval longer than FWHM of the double click peak,
and improved the visibility up to 0.499 ± 0.004 saturating the theoretical limit. Since we try to upper-
bound all possible differences between the pulses, it is not clear if this kind of post-selection can be used
for distinguishability evaluation purposes. If we are sure that jitter is mainly quantum and out of Eve’s
control, such kind of post selection could be treated as removing the events with worst time overlap due
to the quantum randomness of the jitter. In this case we make a tighter bound on the Eve’s abilities. We
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have to be sure, however that the jitter is not caused by the classical effects, which Eve may possibly
account for.
The results by Comandar et al. [29] show that pulsed laser seeding is a promising technology to design
a modulator-free polarization encoding device with multiple sources. Indeed, the method proposed in this
paper together with such kind of design allow to construct a provably secure source, as an alternative to
current ones, used in satellite QKD.
It should also be mentioned that the proposed method is limited by the single-photon detector wave-
length sensitivity. If the source contains side channels in the wavelength range that is out of the detector’s
sensitivity, or even not electromagnetic, this kind of side channels will not be detected by the proposed
approach. One of such examples is the first ever QKD prototype, where one could hear which state has
been generated [30,31] due to high-voltage power supply of Pockels cell.
Conclusion
We introduce a method for an integral evaluation of passive side-channel information leakage from Alice.
We show that for relatively small intensities, fourth-order interference visibility linearly depends on the
degree of non-orthogonality between two PRWCPs. This allows us to connect the results of Hong-Ou-
Mandel experiments with bases imbalance. We include the obtained visibility values into the security
model, and calculate the key generation rate. In this work we address conventional BB84 protocol with
decoy states, however, the concept could be applied to other protocols as well. Current experimental data
has been used to check the applicability of our method for the real-world systems. Future studies on this
topic may include estimation of distinguishability between signal and decoy states. The developed method
can be used both for certification of available QKD systems and for provably-secure systems’ design in
the future.
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Appendix A: Fidelity estimation
In this section we calculate fidelity for two PRWCPs with density matrices ρˆ1 and ρˆ2, from eq. (2) as a
function of HOM visibility.
ρˆ1 =
∞∑
n=0
ρnn |n〉1 〈n|1 =
∞∑
n=0
e−µ
2 µn
n!
(aˆ†1)
n |0〉〈0| (aˆ1)n (16)
,
ρˆ2 =
∞∑
n=0
ρnn
n!
(
√
γaˆ†1 +
√
1− γaˆ†⊥1)n |0〉〈0| (
√
γaˆ1 +
√
1− γaˆ⊥1)n (17)
Here we’ve decomposed the a†2 operator into a sum of the a
†
1 and a
†
⊥1. Therefore a
†
⊥1 represents all the
modes that are orthogonal to a†1. Parameter γ indicates the similarity of these states. We rewrite ρˆ2 as:
ρˆ2 =
∞∑
n=0
ρnn
(
n∑
k=0
√
Ckn(
√
γ)k(
√
1− γ)n−k |k〉1 |n− k〉⊥1
)
·
(
n∑
q=0
〈q|1 〈n− q|⊥1
√
Cqn(
√
γ)q(
√
1− γ)n−q
)
.
(18)
8
For simplicity we replace (1− γ) with a new letter δ. Visualizing the density matrices ρˆ1 and ρˆ2 we have:
ρˆ1 =

ρ00
ρ11
(
1 0
0 0
)
ρ22
1 0 00 0 0
0 0 0

...

(19)
ρˆ2 =

ρ00
ρ11
(
γ
√
γδ√
γδ δ
)
ρ22
 γ2
√
2γ3δ γδ√
2γ3δ 2γδ
√
2γδ3
γδ
√
2γδ3 δ2

...

. (20)
According to the fidelity definition (7), we straightforwardly obtain the result:
√
F (ρˆ1, ρˆ2) = ρ00 +
∞∑
n=1
ρnnγ
n
2 = exp(µ(
√
γ − 1)). (21)
Now we address the visibility equation (5) and find that Vρˆ1ρˆ2 =
γ
2 . So the final result is:√
F (ρˆ1, ρˆ2) = exp
(
µ(
√
2 Vρˆ1ρˆ2 − 1)
)
. (22)
Appendix B: Basis imbalance estimation
To include basis flaw into security model one needs to calculate fidelity between two bases (F (ρˆx, ρˆz)).
Density matrices of X and Z bases could be expressed as follows:
ρˆx =
1
2
(
1 0
0 0
)
⊗ ρˆλx,0 +
1
2
(
0 0
0 1
)
⊗ ρˆλx,1, (23)
ρˆz =
1
2
(
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
)
⊗ ρˆλz,0 +
1
2
(
1/2 −1/2
−1/2 1/2
)
⊗ ρˆλz,1. (24)
Here, ρˆλi,j represents density matrices of non-operational degrees of freedom.
We calculate the fidelity between the bases in two steps. First, we introduce a set of auxiliary density
matrices, calculate the fidelity between the initial and auxiliary states and then, between auxiliary matrices
for different bases. After that, we use the distance and apply triangle inequities, that allow us to bound
the fidelity between the initial states. The idea of the estimation is illustrated om the figure 5.
We define auxiliary density matrices as bases, for which non-operational degrees of freedom are same
for both bits:
ρˆji =
1
2
(
1 0
0 0
)
⊗ ρˆλi,j +
1
2
(
0 0
0 1
)
⊗ ρˆλi,j . (25)
We calculate the fidelity between ρˆx and an auxiliary matrix, where for both bits are the same in
non-operational degrees of freedom. Without loss of generality, we start with a case, when both bits have
a density matrix ρˆλx,0 for non-operational parameters: ρˆ
0
x =
1
2
(
1 0
0 1
)
⊗ ρˆλx,0.
9
Figure 5: Scheme of bases fidelity estimation. A pair of auxiliary matrices for each basis allow to bound
the distance using two triangle inequalities. The distance between two closest auxiliary matrices is used.
F (ρˆx, ρˆ
0
x) = F
(
1
2
(
ρˆλx,0 0
0 ρˆλx,1
)
,
1
2
(
ρˆλx,0 0
0 ρˆλx,0
))
. (26)
As a result, using fidelity definition, we obtain:
√
F (ρˆx, ρˆ0x) =
1 +
√
F (ρˆλx,0, ρˆ
λ
x,1)
2
=
√
F (ρˆx, ρˆ1x). (27)
The fidelities between the initial ρˆx and both auxiliary states ρˆ
0
x and ρˆ
1
x are the same. A similar result
can be obtained for Z-basis as Hadamard transformation can be applied to the operational degree of
freedom for ρˆz, so the resulting fidelity is the same:
√
F (ρˆz, ρˆ0z) =
1 +
√
F (ρˆλz,0, ρˆ
λ
z,1)
2
=
√
F (ρˆz, ρˆ1z). (28)
Now, to apply triangle inequality, we use Bures angle [20], which constitutes metric in Hilbert space:
A(ρˆ1, ρˆ2) = arccos
√
F (ρˆ1, ρˆ2). (29)
As soon as we found the fidelity values between the initial states and the auxiliary ones, we need look
for a pair of auxiliary matrices from both bases, that have maximum fidelity (minimum distance).
As a result of two triangle inequalities we obtain a result:
arccos
√
F(ρˆx, ρˆz) ≤ arccos max
i,j∈0,1
√
F (ρˆλx,i, ρˆ
λ
z,j) +
∑
b∈{x,z}
arccos
1 +
√
F (ρˆλb,0, ρˆ
λ
b,1)
2
. (30)
The final result is expressed as follows:
∆ ≤ 1
2
− 1
2
cos
(
arccos max
i,j∈0,1
√
F (ρˆλx,i, ρˆ
λ
z,j) +
∑
b∈{x,z}
arccos
1 +
√
F (ρˆλb,0, ρˆ
λ
b,1)
2
)
. (31)
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In the special case when all fidelities equal the same value F, equation (31) simplifies:
∆ ≤ 1
2
− 1
2
cos
(
2 arccos
1 +
√
F
2
+ arccos
√
F
)
. (32)
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